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Smart cities have been identified as areas which are urbanized and utilize diverse types of electronic data collection sensors that are 
used to oversee resources and assets efficiently. Smart meters are a unit of smart cities and they collect information about users and 
their consumption patterns. Consequently, the Internet of Things (IoT) being at a steady evolution has prompted multiple users into 
having their data collected from smart meters, stored on cloud servers. This is a way of saving costs and time involved in accessing 
the data. In spite of that, the cloud-assisted IoT faces privacy and security issues. This is as a result of the cloud servers possessing 
an untrusted nature. Due to this, it is essential for the data accumulated from the smart meters be encrypted hitherto outsourcing it 
to the cloud server. However, having encrypted data in the cloud server leads to a complication when it comes to accessing the data. 
For users who are on a different public key system, it becomes illogical for the users to first download the entire data on the cloud 
in order to access the required data. Therefore to resolve this issue, a heterogeneous systems public key encryption with equality 
test (HS-PKE-ET) scheme was proposed. The HS-PKE-ET scheme integrates certificateless public cryptography with equality test 
(CLC-ET) with the public key encryption with equality test (PKI-ET). This scheme allows an authorized cloud server to determine 
if two encryptions encrypted within heterogeneous systems possess equivalent messages. Basing on the random oracle model, the 
proposed scheme’s security is stated under the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption together with the computational Diffie-Hellman 
assumption. Ultimately the size of storage, computation complexities and properties with other related works are focused on and 
illustrations indicate our proposed scheme reflects a good performance. 
 





Based on the challenging new network possibilities, and on steerage competitiveness profits and network improvement e orts, the 
concept of "smart" cities has seemed. (Batamuliza, 2018.) states that a lot of effort has been put in smart cities to understand and 
engage in a world that is increasingly connected. This clearly means growth in urban environments in terms of education, 
healthcare, transportation, etc. Consequently the concept of "smartness" has been embraced in all the aforementioned areas in order 
to fulfill the demands that have emerged as a result of their growth. Based on the facts given by the communication technologies, 
the growth of these utilities will result to better, efficient ways of living for their users. The growth of IoT however can be 
considered to be a booster for the growth of these utilities. And as a result growth of data generated from these utilities is 
experienced such as data from smart watches, smart healthcare, smart vehicles and so forth. This data therefore requires processing 
and storage and hence the cloud servers are responsible for these functionalities. They however require a great extent of network 
resources which culminates to the security and privacy of this data is being compromised. This is because the cloud servers have 
been rendered insecure putting the security and privacy of users into the limelight. A case in point is where body sensors collect the 
health status of a user during a workout and upload to the cloud. This information is considered personal and needs to be kept safe. 
And because of that, users have taken to protect the privacy of their data before storing it to the cloud servers. The continuous 
growth of such smart devices means a rise in demands for power usage for these devices (Jokar, Arianpoo, & Leung, 2016). And 
considering that the current power networks cannot fully bare the demands, smart grid has been considered a new solution to this 
challenge. Smart grid aims at ensuring reliable digital responses to the quickly changing electricity demands and concurrently 
focusing on providing efficient and reliable power systems. The fact that the smart grid has been put into implementation, just like 
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any other technologies, it experiences security and privacy difficulties (Li, Lu, Wang, & Choo, 2016). Devices located from homes, 
businesses, vehicles to personal gadgets collect information about their users and usage patterns and thereafter upload them to the 
cloud. As earlier mentioned the information from these devices is confidential and needs to be secured and to ensure this, the data 
is therefore encrypted before it’s uploaded to the cloud servers. And because of this, public-key encryption has proved to be an 
efficient way to ensure that there is confidentiality. This is achieved by the smart devices using the public key of receivers within 
the network to encrypt the users’ sensitive data before uploading to the cloud server. With this, the data that is uploaded to the 
cloud is secured. Therefore in cases where an authorized user wants to access this data the user is required to download the data 
and then use his/her own private key to decrypt the data in order to access it. However this is quite a tiresome and time-consuming 
process in situations where the data is in huge amounts. With this in consideration, to ensure that a user’s information is not 
disclosed whenever their data is searched; search functionality is supported in the ciphertexts that are stored in the cloud server. 
This allows for the searchability, with no information related to the ciphertexts being exposed. This idea was first proposed by 
Boneh et al. (2004), where the keyword search function was incorporated into Public Key Cryptography and is known as PKE-KS. 
However, PKE-KS being able to support search functionality still experiences a drawback where the search function only works 
for ciphertexts encrypted under the same public key. 
 
To deal with this drawback, Yang et al. (2010) presented a scheme known as Public Key Encryption with Equality Test(PKE-ET) 
where an equality test can not only be performed on ciphertexts encrypted under the same public key but also under different 
public keys. Consequently a lot of work has been put into improving the equality test scheme such as (Tang, 2011; Ma, Zhang, 
Huang, & Yang, 2014; Huang et al., 2015; Lee, Ling, Seo, & Wang, 2016a; Ma, Huang, Zhang, & Yang, 2015; Xu et al., 2017). 
 
As a matter of fact, all the above-mentioned schemes have their construction based on the traditional Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI). A further look into these schemes by (Ma, 2016) resulted in the idea of PKE-ET being incorporated with Identity-based 
public key cryptosystem. This brought forth identity-based encryption with outsourced equality test (IBE-ET) that was built on the 
basis of IBC. The breakthrough in this scheme was that it managed to take a user’s identity as their public key hence eliminate 
certificates found within the PKI. However, the scheme still experiences difficulties as a result of key escrow. Key escrow hap-
pens when decryption keys are put in the care of third parties. Here the third parties have access to a user’s encrypted data and can 
access it any time. 
 
Al-Riyami et al. (2003) however found a way to deal with the key escrow. He proposed a certificateless public key cryptosystem 
(CL-PKC) where user private keys were in two parts; one in possession of the user while the other in possession of the key 
generator center (KGC). This means that the KGC can partially access a user’s private key, which is a good thing since the third 
parties are excluded from accessing users’ data. More research led to Qu et al. (2018) proposing a new notion where he 
incorporated CL-PKC with equality test (CL-PKC-ET). An observation into the above-mentioned schemes indicates their 
homogenous nature, in that they can only be used in environments observing the same public key cryptography. Hence none of 
them can be considered for a cloud-assisted IoT environment that is heterogeneous. Furthermore, we recognize that currently, no 
public key encryption scheme with equality test is pertinent in the current environment. 
 
To address this issue, we establish an effective public key encryption scheme that provides a heterogeneous systems equality test 
(abbreviated as HS-PKE-ET). A typical application scenario using HS-PKE-ET is shown in Figure 1. Within a smart grid 
environment, the data being conveyed (i.e., between the smart meter and cloud server) requires encryption to guarantee users’ 
privacy. Namely, a public key encryption scheme that efficiently provides equality test in a heterogeneous environment is therefore 
required hence the public key infrastructure (PKI) and the certificateless public key system are merged. The PKI has proved to be 
efficient when it comes to achieving user identity authentication and security of data, the customers usually choose to use the PKI 
system to encrypt data. However, the CLC system has solved the certificate management problems brought by the PKI system and 
the problem of key escrow within the IBC system, most smart meters choose to use the CLC system to encrypt data. The collected 
data is encrypted by the smart meter and uploaded to the cloud server. A case in point is a customer wanting to retrieve their 
information stored on the cloud server (i.e., consumption of electricity on specific days). The customer will have to make use of 
their secret key to generate trapdoors, which will be forwarded to the cloud server. This cloud server however has been delegated 
the task of searching the data and then returning the results to the customer. Formerly, performing equality test for customers in 
different public key systems required them to encrypt the accumulated information using the identity of the smart meter owners. 
Considering that different smart meters are matched to different identities, it is imperative that customers find identities that match 
all smart meters. However, this results to substantial overhead and that is where our scheme is incorporated since it diminishes 
vapid process as it improves the operating efficiency. 
 
Our contribution 
This paper nominates a heterogeneous system public key encryption with equality test (HS-PKE-ET) with the integration between 
(PKE-ET) and (CLC-ET) as the center of attention. We base it on the bilinear pairing design that is depicted for smart grid 
environment. Our scheme security will be proved under the BDH assumption and the CDH assumption in the random oracle model 
(ROM). A demonstration of how the scheme will perform shall be illustrated in terms of computation and communication costs 
incurred through storage size, encryption, decryption, and testing phases. 
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Figure 1: A typical scenario of the smart meter. 
 
RELATED WORKS 
Boneh et al. (2004) proposed a way of searching the public key encryption scheme by the use of key-words known as Public Key 
Encryption with Keyword search (PKE-KS). The ciphertexts in this scheme would be run through an equivalence test to determine 
if the keywords are the same. This is done by a third-party that is considered semi-trusted. The unfortunate issue is that IBE-KS has 
limitations when it is applied in real-time applications. Yang et al. (2010) however solved this limitation by proposing an 
encryption scheme that incorporated the equality test, not only on ciphertexts encrypted with the same public keys but also with 
different public keys. This scheme was known as Public Key Encryption with Equality Test (PKE-ET). The advantage of this 
scheme is that, it is quite flexible since an authorized cloud server has the search functionality hence can search messages to 
ascertain whether two ciphertexts encrypted with same or different public keys are equivalent. Consequently, (Tang, 2011) 
proposed a scheme that would enforce authorization on the PKE-ET which was known as fine-grained authorization Public key 
encryption with equality test (FG-PKE-ET). This scheme made provision for only two users to perform equality test. Nevertheless, 
there were situations where delegated parties were the only ones required to finish work in practical multi-user settings. Hence a 
delegated equality test scheme was of importance leading Ma et al. (2014) to propose such a scheme, which was known as (PKE-
DET). Additionally, Ma et al. (2015) improved the PKE-AET by introducing support of flexibility when it came to authorization 
which was known as PKE-ET-FA. Unfortunately the public key infrastructure has proved to be unreliable when it comes to 
scalability since the distribution of public keys is unmanageable. New research areas on Identity-based encryption have hence 
sprouted as shown by (Ma, 2016; Lee, Ling, Seo, & Wang, 2016b; Wu, Zhang, Choo, & He, 2017). This encryption scheme has 
considered the outsourcing of equality tests in order to make the process more flexible when it comes to certificates management. 
And despite this encryption souring from key escrow, Lin et al. (2016) managed to find a solution by introducing the notion of 





Considering two multiplicative cyclic groups 𝔾  , 𝔾 , and their prime order is 𝑝. 𝑔 is a generator of 𝔾  . A bilinear map e : 𝔾 ⨉𝔾 → 𝔾  is required as follows: 
 
1. Bilinearity: ∀𝑔 ∈  𝔾 , ∃𝑎, 𝑏 ∈  𝑍∗, 𝑒(𝑔 , 𝑔 ) = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) . 
 
2. Non-degeneracy: 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) ≠ 1. 
 
Hardness Problems 
Establishing our scheme under the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem and the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem, 
the security of our system is defined. We describe these two hardness problems as follows: 
BDH problem. Randomly choose , 𝑏, 𝑐 ∈  𝑍∗  , the BDH assumption holds if for any polynomial-time algorithm 𝓐 which wants to 
distinguish the tuple <  𝑔 , 𝑔 , 𝑔 ,  𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝑏𝑐  > from <  𝑔 , 𝑔 , 𝑔 , 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)  >  , the advantage is negligible. 
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Figure 2: System Model of HS-PKE-ET. 
 
CDH problem. Randomly choose 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ∈  𝑍∗ , the CDH assumption holds if for any polynomial-time algorithm 𝓐 which wants 
to distinguish the tuple <  𝑔 , 𝑔 , 𝑔 > from <  𝑔 , 𝑔 , 𝑔  >, the advantage is negligible. 
 
System model 
Figure 2 illustrates the heterogeneous systems public key encryption with equality test (HS-PKE-ET). The HS-PKE-ET model is 
made up of five entities: the smart meter, customer, key generation center (KGC), the certificate authority (CA), and a cloud server. 
Smart meter belongs to the CLC system, while the customer belongs to the PKI system. For the CLC system the smart meter sends 
its identity to the KGS, and the KGS prompts a corresponding partial secret key (D) and delivers it back to the smart meter. 
Consequently, on the PKI system side customer communicates with the CA to obtain a certificate signed by the CA. The smart 
meter and the customer then compute their particular trapdoors denoted by 𝑡𝑑  and 𝑡𝑑  , respectively. Subsequently, the smart 
meter uses the owner’s ID to encrypt the collected data and uploads the encryptions alongside the trapdoor 𝑡𝑑  to the cloud 
server for storage. When the customer desires to retrieve information, he/she uploads his/her trapdoor 𝑡𝑑  to the cloud server for 




According to (Ma, 2016), one-way chosen-ciphertext attack (OW-CCA) security against the adversary in HS-PKE-ET is defined. 
For streamlining, HS-PKE-ET-CLC to denote the situation that users belong to the CLC system and HS-PKE-ET-PKI to denote 
the situation that users belong to the PKI system are used. 
 
Definition 1. For the security of HS-PKE-ET-CLC we consider two types of adversaries. Type-1 adversary 𝒜  cannot retrieve the 
system’s secret master key, but has the ability to replace any user’s public key. Type-2 adversary 𝒜2 has no ability to replace a 
user’s public key, but can retrieve the system’s master secret key. HS-PKE-ET-CLC’s security model is expounded by the 
following two games: 
Game 1: Given a security parameter λ , the game between 𝒜   and the challenger is defined as follows: 
 
1. Setup: The challenger creates the public parameters PubP and the master secret key msk. Finally, the challenger returns 
PubP. 
2. Phase 1: The 𝒜   is permitted to issue the following queries: 
 
• Partial secret key queries  < 𝐼𝐷 : The challenger sends Di to 𝒜 . 
• Secret key queries  < 𝐼𝐷 : The challenger sends 𝑠𝑘  to 𝒜 . 
• Public key queries  < 𝐼𝐷 : The challenger sends 𝑝𝑘   to 𝒜 . 
• Replace public key queries < 𝐼𝐷 , 𝑝𝑘 >: The challenger replaces the public key pk of the corresponding user with 𝑝𝑘 . 
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• Decryption queries< 𝐼𝐷 , 𝐶 >: The challenger runs the algorithm CLC-Decrypt         (𝐶 , 𝑠𝑘 ) where 𝑠𝑘  is the 
secret key corresponding to 𝐼𝐷 . Finally, the challenger gives iM  to 𝒜 . 
 
• Trapdoor queries: The challenger creates the trapdoors 𝑡𝑑   and 𝑡𝑑  by using CLC-Trapdoor and PKI-Trapdoor 
algorithms, respectively. Eventually, the chal-lenger gives 𝑡𝑑  and 𝑡𝑑   to  𝒜 . 
 
3. Challenge: The challenger randomly chooses the plaintext 𝑀 ∈ 𝐺∗ and computes   Cʹ= CLC-Encrypt (𝐼𝐷 , 𝑀). Finally, the 
challenger sends 'C  to 𝒜  as its challenge ciphertext. 
 
4. Phase 2: The challenger’s response to 𝒜  is similar to that in Phase 1 on the grounds that: 
 
• IDch is not queried in the Secret key queries. 
 
• If the public key associated with 𝐼𝐷  is replaced, the 𝐼𝐷  should not be queried in the Partial secret key queries. 
• If the public key of the user is replaced, the corresponding identity 𝐼𝐷  should not be queried in the Secret key queries. 
 
• 𝐼𝐷 ,𝐶  is not inquired in the Decryption queries. 
 
5. Guess: 𝒜  outputs  𝑀  , and wins if 𝑀 = 𝑀. The advantage of 𝒜  in the game above is defined as follows: 
 𝐴𝑑𝑣 ,,  (𝜆) = 𝑃𝑟 𝑀 =  𝑀  
 
Game 2: Provided with a security parameter 𝜆, the game between 𝒜  and the challenger is expounded as follows: 
 
1. Setup: The challenger generates the public parameters PubP and master secret key msk. Finally, the challenger gives PubP 
and the msk to 𝒜2. 
 
2. Phase 1: 𝒜2 issues queries as in Game 1, except the Partial secret key queries and the Replace public key queries are not allowed 
to issue in this game. 
 
3. Challenge: The challenger randomly picks the plaintext 𝑀 ∈ 𝐺∗ and computes 
'C  = CLC-Encrypt (𝐼𝐷 , 𝑀). Finally, the challenger gives 'C  to 𝒜2 as its challenge cipher-text. 
 
4. Phase 2: The challenger’s response to 𝒜2 is similar to that in Phase 1 on grounds that: 
•  𝐼𝐷  is not queried in the Secret key queries.   
•  (𝐼𝐷 , 𝐶∗) is not queried in the Decryption queries.  
 
5. Guess: 𝒜2 outputs 'M  , and wins if 'M  = M . Therefore, 𝒜2 advantage in the game is: 
 𝐴𝑑𝑣 ,,  (𝜆) = 𝑃𝑟 𝑀 =  𝑀  
 
Definition 2. For the security of HS-PKE-ET-PKI scheme, we said the HS-PKE-ET-PKI has OW-CCA property if no 
polynomially bounded adversary 𝒜 has a non-negligible advantage in the following game. 
 
1. Setup: The challenger uses as input security parameters 𝜆. Then, the challenger accords the system parameters to 𝒜 and 
retains the msk secret. 
2. Phase 1: 𝒜 is allowed to inquire as follows: 
o Key generation queries <i>: The challenger sends 𝑠𝑘  to 𝒜. 
o Decryption queries<i,Ci>:The challenger runs PKI-Decrypt (𝐶 , 𝑠𝑘 ) algorithm and sends the plaintext M  to 𝒜 . 
o Trapdoor queries <i>: The challenger creates the trapdoors 𝑡𝑑  and𝑡𝑑  by using CLC-Trapdoor and PKI-
Trapdoor algorithms, respectively. Finally, the challenger sends 𝑡𝑑  and 𝑡𝑑  to 𝒜. 
 
3. Challenge: The challenger arbitrary chooses a plaintext 𝑀 ∈ 𝐺∗  and computes Cʹ = PKI-Encrypt(𝑝𝑘 , 𝑀). In addition, the 
challenger creates a trapdoor 𝑡𝑑  associated with 𝑠𝑘   by using PKI-Trapdoor algorithm. Finally, the challenger sends (𝐶 , 𝑡𝑑 ) to 𝒜. 
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4. Phase 2: In this phase, the response of C to 𝒜 is similar to the one obtained in Phase 1. The following constraints are 
considered. 
•  < 𝑝𝑘 > is not requested in the key generation queries.  
 
•  < 𝑝𝑘 , 𝐶 > is not requested in the decryption queries.  
 
5. Guess: 𝒜 outputs *1' GM ∈ , and wins if  𝑀 =  𝑀 . The advantages of 𝒜 in the game above is defined as follows: 
 𝐴𝑑𝑣 ,,  (𝜆) = 𝑃𝑟 𝑀 =  𝑀  
 
CONSTRUCTION 
The concrete constructions of heterogeneous systems public key encryption with equality test are instituted in this section. 
 
1. Setup: Provided a security parameter 𝜆, the algorithm runs as follows: 
• Generate the pairing parameters: two groups 𝐺 , 𝐺 of prime order p and an admissible bilinear map 𝑒: 𝔾 x𝔾 →𝐺  .Then choose a random generator  𝑔 ∈  𝔾 . 
• Choose cryptographic hash functions:                    𝐻 : 0,1 ∗ →, 𝐻 : 𝐺 → 𝐺 , 𝐻 : 𝐺  → 0,1 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑛 = |𝐺 |𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛 = 𝑍∗  
• Randomly choose (𝑠 , 𝑠 ) ∈  𝑍∗  , then set 𝑔 = 𝑔  and  𝑔 = 𝑔 . The CLC-PKG publishes system parameters <𝑝, 𝐺 , 𝐺 , 𝑒, 𝑔, 𝑔 , 𝑔 , 𝐻 , 𝐻 , 𝐻 > and keeps the master secret key (𝑠 ,𝑠 ) secret. 
 
2. CLC-PKG: To generate public and secret key, this algorithm works as follows: 
 
•  Generate partial secret key: Given a string 𝐼𝐷 ∈  0,1 ∗: 
– Compute ℎ = 𝐻 (𝐼𝐷) ∈  𝔾    
– Compute partial secret key  𝐷 = (𝐷 , 𝐷 ) = ℎ , ℎ  , where (𝑠 , 𝑠 ) is the master secret key. 
•  Assign secret value: The algorithm uses as inputs PubP and D. It chooses 𝑥 ∈  𝑍∗  randomly then returns x as a secret 
value. 
•  Assign secret key: The algorithm uses as inputs PubP, D, and x. It computes 𝑠𝑘 = (𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠𝑘 )  = (𝐷 , 𝐷 ) .  
•  Assign public key: The algorithm uses as inputs PubP and a secret value x. It returns public key 
 𝑝𝑘 = (𝑋, 𝑝𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘 ) = (𝑔 , 𝑔 , 𝑔 ). 
 
3. IBC-Trapdoor: This algorithm takes as input sk of a user in the CLC system and outputs a trapdoor  𝑡𝑑 = 𝑠𝑘 = 𝐷 . 
  
4. PKI-KG: A user in the PKI system chooses two arbitrary numbers 𝜃, 𝛽 ∈  𝑍∗  ,and computes (𝑠𝑘, 𝑝𝑘) = ((𝜃, 𝛽), 𝑔 , 𝑔 )
  
5. PKI-Trapdoor: This algorithm utilizes as input sk of a user in the PKI system and outputs a trapdoor 𝑡𝑑 = 𝜃 
 
6. CLC-Encrypt: This algorithm proceeds as follows: 
 
• Take the message 𝑀 ∈ 𝔾∗  , the identity ID, and the public key 𝑝𝑘 = (𝑋, 𝑝𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘 ) as inputs. 
• Verify that if 𝑝𝑘 = (𝑋, 𝑝𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘 ) ∈  𝔾∗   and 𝑒(𝑋, 𝑔 ) = 𝑒(𝑝𝑘 ,𝑔)  and 𝑒(𝑋, 𝑔 ) = 𝑒(𝑝𝑘 , 𝑔). If these verifications 
pass, perform the encryption. Otherwise, terminate the encryption. 
• Compute ℎ = 𝐻 (𝐼𝐷) ∈  𝔾∗ . 
• Pick two arbitrary numbers (𝑟 , 𝑟 ) ∈ 𝑍∗ .  
• Compute 𝐶 =  (𝐶 , 𝐶 , 𝐶 , 𝐶 ), where 𝐶 = 𝑔 , 𝐶 = 𝑔 , 𝐶 = 𝑀 ∙ 𝐻 (𝑒(ℎ , 𝑝𝑘 ) ), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = (𝑀||𝑟 ) ⊕𝐻 (𝑒(ℎ , 𝑝𝑘 ) ).  
 
7. CLC-Decrypt: The algorithm uses as inputs a ciphertext C and a secret key sk. It returns the plaintext M by working as 
follows. 
 
• Compute 𝐶  ⊕ 𝐻 𝑒(𝑠𝑘 , 𝐶 ) =  𝐶  ⊕  𝐻 𝑒(𝑠𝑘 , 𝐶 ) =  𝐶 ⊕ 𝐻  𝑒 𝐷 , 𝑔 = 𝐶 ⊕ 𝐻 (𝑒 ℎ , 𝑔 ) =(𝑀||𝑟 )  
• Verify if 𝐶 = 𝑔  and   =  𝐻  (𝑒(𝑠𝑘 , 𝐶 )) . 
• If both verifications pass, return M. Otherwise, return the symbol ┴. 
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8. PKI-Encrypt: It utilizes as inputs a message M and the public key pk of a user in the PKI system. Then, it chooses two 
random numbers (𝑟 , 𝑟 )  ∈  𝑍∗  and computes 
 𝐶 = (𝐶 , 𝐶 , 𝐶 , 𝐶 ) , where  𝐶 = 𝑔 , 𝐶 = 𝑔 , 𝐶 = 𝑀 ∙ 𝐻 𝑔 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = (𝑀||𝑟 ) ⨁ 𝐻 (𝑔 )  
9. PKI-Decrypt: It takes as inputs a ciphertext C and secret key sk of a user in the PKI system. Then, gives back the plaintext M 
by computing 𝑀||𝑟 ←  𝐶 ⊕ 𝐻 (𝐶 ), and then verifies both 𝐶 = 𝑔  and  = 𝐻  (𝐶 ) . In the event that both 
verifications pass, it returns M else, it returns the symbol ⊥ . 
 
10.   Test (𝐶 , 𝑡𝑑 , 𝐶 , 𝑡𝑑 ): Let 𝑈  and 𝑈  be two users of heterogeneous systems. Let  𝑈  be a user in the CLC system and 𝑈  be a user in the PKI system. Let 𝐶 = (𝐶 , , 𝐶 , , 𝐶 , , 𝐶 , ) and 𝐶 = (𝐶 , , 𝐶 , , 𝐶 , , 𝐶 , ) be the ciphertexts of 𝑈  and𝑈 , 
respectively. The Test algorithm for heterogeneous systems works as follows: 
 
 
The Test algorithm returns 1 if  𝑒(𝐶 , , 𝑅 ) = 𝑒(𝐶 , , 𝑅 ). Otherwise, it returns the symbol ⊥ . 
 
SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this segment, the security of the HS-PKE-ET scheme is presented. The basic notion of security proof is similar to the scheme in 
(Al-Riyami & Paterson, 2003) and (Huang et al., 2015). 
 
Theorem 1: Presuming that 𝐻 , 𝐻 , 𝐻  are random oracles and assume that the BDH problem is hard. Therefore, our HS-PKE-ET-
CLC is OW-CCA secure. Significantly, assume there is a Type-1 adversary 𝒜  that has advantage 𝜀 (𝜆) against the HS-PKE-
ET-CLC. Assume that 𝒜  makes 𝑞  public key queries, 𝑞  secret key queries, 𝑞  partial secret key queries, 𝑞  trapdoor 
queries, 𝑞  replace public key queries, 𝑞  decryption queries, 𝑞  hash queries to 𝐻 , and 𝑞  hash queries to 𝐻 . Thus, we 
have an algorithm ℬ  which breaks BDH problem with advantage at least 𝜀 (𝜆)/𝑒(𝑞 + 𝑞 + 𝑞 + 1). 𝑞 . 
 
Theorem 2: Presuming that 𝐻 , 𝐻 , 𝐻  are random oracles and assume that the BDH problem is hard. Therefore, our HS-PKE-ET-
CLC is OW-CCA secure. Significantly, assume there is a Type-2 adversary 𝒜  that has advantage 𝜀 (𝜆) against the HS-PKE-
ET-CLC. Assume that 𝒜  makes 𝑞  public key queries, 𝑞  secret key queries, 𝑞  trapdoor queries, 𝑞  decryption queries, 𝑞  
hash queries to 𝐻 , and 𝑞  hash queries to 𝐻 . Thus, we have an algorithm ℬ  which breaks BDH problem with advantage at least 𝜀 (𝜆)/𝑒(𝑞 + 𝑞 + 1). 𝑞 . 
 
Theorem 3: HS-PKE-ET-PKI is OW-CCA secure against the adversary 𝒜 if CDH problem is intractable. 
 
Proof: Assume that 𝒜 is an adversary, who is permitted to make qk key generation queries, decryption queries, 𝑞  trapdoor queries, 𝑞  hash queries to 𝐻 , and 𝑞  hash queries to 𝐻 . The algorithm ℬ emulates certain games, dominates oracle 𝑂𝐾, 𝑂𝐷, 𝑂𝑇, 𝑂 , 
and 𝑂 , and then utilizes the advantage of 𝒜 to break CDH problem if 𝒜 breaks HS-PKE-ET-PKI. Consequently, a sequence of 
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hybrid games are presented for verification of the security of our scheme. Due to the limited number of pages, the interested 
readers can refer to (Al-Riyami & Paterson, 2003) and (Huang et al., 2015) for more details. 
 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
In Table 1, the computation cost and communication cost of the proposed HS-PKE-ET scheme and the schemes in (Yang et al., 2010), 
(Ma, Huang, et al., 2015), (Ma, 2016), (Lin et al., 2016), and (Qu et al., 2018) are compared. 
 
Table 1: Comparison 
Schemes |PK| |SK| |CT| Enc Dec Test H-ET 
(Yang et al., 2010) 𝔾 2𝑍  3𝔾+𝑍  3Exp 3Exp 2Pair No 
(Ma et al., 2015) 3𝔾 3𝑍  5𝔾+𝑍  6Exp 5Exp 2Pair+2Exp No 
(Ma, 2016) 2𝔾 2𝑍  4𝔾+𝑍  6Exp 2Pair+2Exp 4Pair No 
(Lin et al., 2016) 2𝔾 2𝑍  5𝔾+𝑍  6Exp 2Pair+2Exp 4Pair No 
(Qu et al., 2018) 2𝔾 2𝑍  5𝔾+𝑍  5Exp 2Pair+2Exp 4Pair No 
HS-PKE-ET 2𝔾 2𝑍  3𝔾+𝑍  5Exp 2Pair+2Exp 3Pair+1Exp Yes 
Legends: |PK|, |SK|, and |CT|: size of public key, size of secret key, size of and ciphertext, respectively; Enc, Dec, and Test: the computation 
complexity of encryption, decryption, and test algorithms; Exp: an exponentiation operation; Pair: pairing operation; H-ET: the scheme that 
provides heterogeneous equality test. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We nominate an efficient equality test for heterogeneous systems in this paper. The nature of the heterogeneity in our scheme 
allows for a cloud server to accomplish an equivalence test between ciphertexts that have been encrypted under the PKI system and 
CLC system. Furthermore, we have reduced our scheme’s security proof to the standard Bilinear Di e-Hellman assumption and 
computational Diffie-Hellman assumption by basing it on the random oracle model. Our speculative analysis and simulations from 
experiments indicate our scheme’s practicability and suitability in comparison to other related works. Future works include 
expansion of the heterogeneous equality test to make provision for users to delegate a cloud server rights to execute equality test 
employing different types of authorizations.  
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
This work was supported in part by the 13th Five-Year Plan of National Cryptography Development Fund for Cryptographic 
Theory of China under Grant MMJJ20170204, in part by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities under Grant 
ZYGX2016J091, the Guangxi Colleges and Universities Key Laboratory of Cloud Computing and Complex Systems, and in part 
by the Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants U1401257, 61472064 and 61602096. 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] Abdalla, M., Bellare, M., Catalano, D., Kiltz, E., Kohno, T., Lange, T., .Shi, H. (2005). Searchable encryption revisited: 
Consistency properties, relation to anonymous ibe, and extensions. In Crypto (Vol. 3621, pp. 205–222). 
[2] Al-Riyami, S. S., & Paterson, K. G. (2003). Certificateless public key cryptography. In Asiacrypt (Vol. 2894, pp. 452–473). 
[3] Baek, J., Safavi-Naini, R., & Susilo, W. (2008). Public key encryption with keyword search revisited. Computational Science 
and Its Applications–ICCSA 2008, 1249–1259. 
[4] Batamuliza, J. (2018). Certificateless secure anonymous key distribution scheme for smart grid. International Journal of 
Computer Applications (Vol. 180 – No.24). 
[5] Boneh, D., Di Crescenzo, G., Ostrovsky, R., & Persiano, G. (2004). Public key encryption with keyword search. In 
International conference on the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques (pp. 506–522). 
[6] Huang, K., Tso, R., Chen, Y.-C., Rahman, S. M. M., Almogren, A., & Alamri, A. (2015). Pke-aet: public key encryption with 
authorized equality test. The Computer Journal, 58(10), 2686–2697.  
[7] Jokar, P., Arianpoo, N., & Leung, V. C. (2016). A survey on security issues in smart grids. Security and Communication 
Networks, 9(3), 262–273. 
[8] Lee, H. T., Ling, S., Seo, J. H., & Wang, H. (2016a). Cca2 attack and modification of huang et al.s public key encryption 
with authorized equality test. The Computer Journal, 59(11), 1689–1694. 
[9] Lee, H. T., Ling, S., Seo, J. H., & Wang, H. (2016b). Semi-generic construction of public key encryption and identity-based 
encryption with equality test. Information Sciences, 373, 419–440. 
[10] Li, B., Lu, R., Wang, W., & Choo, K.-K. R. (2016). Ddoa: A dirichlet-based detection scheme for opportunistic attacks in 
smart grid cyber-physical system. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 11(11), 2415–2425. 
[11] Lin, X. J., Yan, Z., Zhang, Q., & Qu, H. (2016). Certificateless public key encryption with equality test. IACR Cryptology 
ePrint Archive, 2016, 1129. 
[12] Lynn, B. (2013). The Stanford pairing based crypto library. Privacy Preservation Scheme for Multicast Communications in 
Smart Buildings of the Smart Grid, 324. 
                                                                                                 Elhabob, Sella, Zhao, Zhu & Xiong 
The 18th International Conference on Electronic Business, Guilin, China, December 2-6, 2018 
52 
[13] Ma, S. (2016). Identity-based encryption with outsourced equality test in cloud computing. Information Sciences, 328, 389–
402. 
[14] Ma, S., Huang, Q., Zhang, M., & Yang, B. (2015). Efficient public key encryption with equality test supporting flexible 
authorization. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 10(3), 458–470. 
[15] Ma, S., Zhang, M., Huang, Q., & Yang, B. (2015). Public key encryption with delegated equality test in a multi-user setting. 
The Computer Journal, 58(4), 986–1002.  
[16] Qu, H., Yan, Z., Lin, X.-J., & Zhang, Q. (2018). Certificateless public key encryption with equality test. 
[17] Tang, Q. (2011). Towards public key encryption scheme supporting equality test with fine-grained authorization. In 
Australasian conference on information security and privacy (pp. 389–406). 
[18] Wu, L., Zhang, Y., Choo, K.-K. R., & He, D. (2017). Efficient and secure identity-based encryption scheme with equality test 
in cloud computing. Future Generation Computer Systems, 73, 22–31. 
[19] Xu, Y., Wang, M., Zhong, H., Cui, J., Liu, L., & Franqueira, V. N. (2017). Verifiable public key encryption scheme with 
equality test in 5g networks. IEEE Access. 
[20] Yang, G., Tan, C. H., Huang, Q., & Wong, D. S. (2010). Probabilistic public key encryption with equality test. In 
Cryptographers track at the rsa conference (pp. 119–131). 
